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I. INTRODUCTION
Of late, a number of important Establishment Clause cases
have been decided on the basis of a coercion test.' Some important
scholarly support has emerged for such an approach. Certainly
other Establishment Clause tests, including the three-part test
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, have been subjected to serious
critique. But the deficiencies of the alternative tests do not validate
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis.
' Merely by way of example, see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692, 693
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion & Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 707,
733 n.35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (presenting a limited critique of the coercion
test); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45, 47-54 (2004) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120-21
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
310-11, 316-17 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-99 (1992); id. at 599,
604-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 609, 618-21 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at
631, 632-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
655-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1094 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2009); Green v. Has-
kell County Bd. of Comm'rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1236, n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying
rehearing en banc); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008)
(criticizing the Lemon test); Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 867-70 (7th Cir.
2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (establishment entails coercion); Child Evan-
gelism Fellowship v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 597-98 (4th Cir.
2004); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2001).
2 The most influential article along these lines is that of Michael W. McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933 (1986) (de-
clining to define coercion); id. at 941 (but seeking generally to link Establishment
Clause violations with the deprivation of religious liberty); see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795 (1993).
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our Religion Clause
jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on formulaic ab-
stractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted
constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been the so-called Lemon
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a coercion test in the Establishment Clause area or, for that matter,
in any other area of the law.' This Article illustrates the uselessness
of coercion tests in the Establishment Clause context.
test, . . . which has received well-earned criticism from many Members of this
Court.") (citations omitted); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
plurality opinion); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring
to Lemon's "checkered career in the decisional law of this Court"); County of Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., for a group of fourJustices, critiquing the
Lemon test). For a concise critique of Justice O'Connor's Endorsement test, as
articulated in, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 690 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("We must examine both what [the City] intended to communicate
. . . and what message the [City's] display actually conveyed), see Books, 401 F.3d at
869 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Endorsement differs from establishment.")
(internal quotations removed).
- The concept of coercion arises in many different areas of the law, but may be of
no more distinctive use or value in those areas than in our Establishment Clause
cases. We hold open the possibility that the actual meaning, or meanings, of coer-
cion itself may vary, depending upon the subject matter area and context. See, e.g.,
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 287 (1987) (" [A] proposal could constitute contrac-
tual duress, while a similar proposal would not establish duress as a defense to a
crime."). For a much broader perspective on such possibilities, see, e.g.,
CONTEXTUALISM IN PHILOSOPHY: KNOWLEDGE, MEANING AND TRUTH (Gerhard
Preyer & Georg Peter eds., 2005).
For a mere sampling of the range of legal subject matter in which the idea of coer-
cion has been applied, see, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-20
(1969) (seeking to distinguish between well-founded employer predictions of
probable future events beyond the employer's influence and more or less subtle
threats of future employer retaliation amounting to coercion); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-72 (1936) (coercion of farmers through Spending Clause
inducements as exerting pressure, undermining voluntariness, and arguing that
the coercive purpose and intent of the statute is not obscured by the fact that it
has not been perfectly successful); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-
12 (1987) (finding that under the Spending Clause, and at least under the present
circumstances, relatively mild and limited pressure exerted on the presumably not
financially dependent states is not coercive, even if states acquiescence is uniform
and predictable); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)
(concluding, contrary to the general tone of Butler, in the Spending Clause area
that "to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the
law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is ... a philosophical
determinism by which choice becomes impossible.") (assuming, quite controver-
sially, that all coercive programs must successfully dictate or determine the actual
outcome or the unduly influenced "choice"); Butler, 297 U.S. at 78, 81-82 (Stone,
J., dissenting) (distinguishing between potentially coercive threats and non-
coercive offers, at least in the Spending Clause context, and noting that it was not
clear to many offerees whether they would be better off by accepting the subsidy in
exchange for planting reduced acreage, thus weakening the case for claiming that
such offers are coercive). But cf Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-37 (1991)
(dispute over the genuinely consensual versus subtly and circumstantially or con-
textually coercive nature of a random search, by two officers, of a seated passen-
ger's baggage on a parked interstate bus scheduled to depart) (raising, implicitly,
the question of whether an allegedly coercing party must have actually created
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The idea of coercion appears prominently in Establishment
6 7Clause cases and in a wide variety of other legal contexts. The
frequent use of the idea of coercion in the law, however, does not
mean that the courts have always consciously held or articulated a
theory of coercion." The Establishment Clause cases, and the
school invocation cases upon which we will focus in particular, ac-
tually raise more questions about the idea of coercion than they
answer. Once the major conceptual questions about coercion are
answered as effectively as possible, however, we are ultimately and
inevitably left to recognize the uselessness of the concept in our
constitutional context.
II. SOME INITIAL MULTI-DISCIPLINARY THOUGHTS ON COERCION
There can be no doubt that the idea of coercion holds a
prominent place in social and legal theory. But the general conno-
tations of coercion seem to be much clearer than its precise mean-
ing. In typical instances, coercion is widely thought of as morally
some or all of the jointly constraining circumstances, or whether it is enough that
the allegedly coercing party either intentionally or non-consciously takes advan-
tage of independent constraining circumstances rendering the defendant vulner-
able to coercive pressure);United States v. Ybarra, 580 F.3d 735, 738-39 (8th Cir.
2009) (regarding the potential coerciveness of a supplemental Allen charge to a
deadlocked jury) (A potentially "unduly coercive" charge (as opposed to perhaps
coercive, but not unduly coercive) is based on "the content of the instruction, . . .
the length of deliberation after the Allen charge, . . . the total length of the delib-
eration, and . . . any indicia in the record of coercion or pressure on the jury."
(citations omitted). The court did not further clarify whether "pressure" is, in this
context, coercive (or unduly coercive) or the broader question of the relation
between a prompt or a delayed jury decision and any coercive effect of the Allen
charge.); United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1978) (In the
context of an attempted prison escape, "coercion" is apparently treated as syn-
onymous with both "duress" and "necessity." This requires a specific and immedi-
ate threat of death or serious bodily harm and lack of alternatives to escape, as well
as other defense elements grounded in public policy rather than in the logic of
"coercion" itself, such as lack of escapee violence and an intent to promptly sur-
render.); WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 187 ("When the federal government threat-
ens to withhold state highway funds if a state does not raise its drinking age to
twenty-one, it may be said that it is 'forcing' (or 'blackmailing') the states into
compliance.").
' See supra note 1.
7 See supra note 5.
8 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 12.
' For the sake of convenience, our main focus herein will be on the public school
invocation cases of Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.
1o See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at xi ("[C]oercion claims are crucial to our
views of various social practices and, in fact, to the adequacy of general social
theories. . . .").
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undesirable." Coercion is commonly thought to be "physically or
psychologically painful," to interfere with "individual autonomy,"
or to seek to degrade the object of the coercion. It has been ar-
gued in particular that "to coerce a man rather than persuade him
is to treat him as a thing governed by causes rather than as a person
guided by reasons." Descriptively, however, the idea of coercion is
less clear. We may take a first descriptive step, with the leading
theorist, Isaiah Berlin, by saying that "[t]o coerce a man is to de-
prive him of freedom." 6 But not all deprivations of freedom," and
not all rights violations, 8 must involve coercion. One form of this
argument has been expressed by Professor Jeremy Waldron:
"[L] essening options is not definitive of coercion: when a person . .
. sleeps on his own floor, he lessens others' options-for they can
now not make use of those resources-but he can hardly be said to
be coercing them.""
It is difficult to go beyond this initial point without encounter-
ing controversy, but, for our purposes, here is a possible bare
framework: In many-but not all-cases of coercion, there will be
one or more coercing parties (A) employing or taking advantage of
" See, e.g., CHRISmiAN BAY, THE STRUCUuRE OF FREEDOM 92 (1958) (coercion as the
supreme political evil); Michael D. Bayles, A CONCEPT OF COERCION, in COERCION
16, 16 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 2007) (1972) ("[T]he use of
coercion is generally thought to be morally bad."); J. Roland Pennock, Coercion: An
Overview, in COERCION 1, 2 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 2007)
(1972) ("'Liberty' is a 'virtue word': for some more than others, but it generally
has a positive connotation; 'coercion' the reverse."); Peter Westen, "Freedom" and
"Coercion"- Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DuKE L.J. 541, 547 (1985).
I2 Bayles, supra note 11, at 9.
is Id.
1 Robert Paul Wolff, Is Coercion "Ethically Neutral", in COERCION 144, 146 (J. Ro-
land Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 2007) (1972).
'5 Id. Coercion of one competent adult person by another may, relatedly, violate
basic norms of equality underlying democratic theory, though this argument may
be murkier in some instances of coercion by a representative government. In any
event, none of this should rule out all instances of coercion, whether of public
school students or not, as invariably unjustifiable at a moral or constitutional level.
On the other hand, it has been argued that societal disapproval and the diffuse
pressures of market price competition can be coercive even if not deliberately or
intentionally imposed. See Pennock, supra note 11, at 3-4. Unfortunately, coercion
theory offers no overall consensus on this crucial point. See infra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text.
16 ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR EssAYs ON LIBERTY 168 (Henry
Hardy ed., 2002).
" See JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLEGED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 236
(1993).
' See id.
19 Id.
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some means (M) directly or indirectly to successfully or unsuccess-
fully induce one or more parties (B) to do or refrain from (usually)
some action, belief, or choice (X).20 This is a crude typology,
merely to get the analysis underway. We shall refrain from pointing
out exceptions, controversies, and complications until the need
arises below, but this typology should suffice as a basic framework
for the public school invocation cases discussed below.'
The most basic distinction among cases of coercion is between
coercion that is "non-volitional" on the part of the coerced party, B,
and cases of "constrained volition" on the part of B. Non-
volitional coercion is involved when the will of the coerced party, B,
is simply overwhelmed, bypassed, rendered irrelevant, or im-
paired.2 3 Locking B in a room could count as non-volitional coer-
cion. In contrast, "constrained volition" coercion leaves B capable
of knowingly and, in a sense, intentionally choosing between op-
tions, both of which are substantially unattractive. The latter
form, constrained volition, is said to be the standard case of coer-
cion. And in these latter, presumably standard, cases, it has been
said that "B has no reasonable alternative but to do X [in accor-
dance with A's wishes] and . .. it is wrong for A to make such a pro-
posal to B [or otherwise place B in such a constrained choice situa-
tion] ."
There is much in these bare schematic accounts that will be
important for our purposes, most crucially that A's constraining of
B's volition must, on most accounts, be deemed "wrong" in some
sense in order to count as coercion in the first place. But even
this most basic distinction between non-volitional and constrained
volition coercion may not always be crucial to the public school
2 SeeWERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 5 (providing a basic typology of coercion).
21 See infra Section IV.
22 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 9-10; IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM 224
(1999). This distinction is also emphasized in Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar,
Credible Coercion, 83 TEx. L. REv. 717 (2005). In our cases, the distinction is either
difficult to draw, or of less than monumental legal or practical significance. Of
course, even a legally anonymous plaintiff in our public school cases may antici-
pate great social pressures and sanctions from litigating the case.
2 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 10.
24 See id. at 9-10.
2 See id. at 10.
2 Id. at 172.
2 See infra notes 67, 81 and accompanying text. If we were to instead take coer-
cion to be morally neutral, we would have to wonder why a morally neutral act
would be an especially helpful signal that the government has committed the seri-
ous moral wrong of violating the Establishment Clause. See infra note 50 and ac-
companying text. We do not, on the other hand, prejudge whether or how coer-
cion can be justified. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
197
CUMBERLAND LAWREV1EW
religious invocation cases. Consider two case scenarios. If the
invocation is unannounced, or not widely publicized in advance of
the school event, we may wish to say that a coerced person's will has
been bypassed or rendered irrelevant through non-volitional coer-
cion." But if the invocation is anticipated, and a given student con-
siders her options and costs, even very briefly, we may wish instead
to say that any coercion involved is that of the constrained volition
type.30 Either type of coercion might be present in an invocation
case.
Any theory of the proper use of the idea of coercion must cer-
tainly depend upon the best conceptual analysis of coercion that we
can manage. It is useful to remember that the best conceptual
analysis must ultimately be true to the insights of heroes, saints,
political figures, realistic literary figures, political theorists, and phi-
losophers, as well as those of social scientists. Such a broad and
thorough analysis of coercion must remain beyond our scope. We
should, however, recognize at least some brief examples of how the
idea of coercion has been seen from broader perspectives.
The historical institution of chattel slavery, for example, has
involved some of the severest forms of ongoing physical coercion.
From this institution we learn, however, how it can also be possible
that a single, determined act of defiance can have, as in the famous
case of Frederick Douglass, a transforming and even liberating ef-
fect.3' More subtly, the example of Frederick Douglass and his re-
sistance illustrates some of the inherent limitations on coercion
even under slavery: The slave master who values his reputation for
successfully coercing his slaves may not always be able to afford to
conspicuously punish a defiant slave, because that punishment
might be perceived as evidence of the slave master's own weak-
nesses and limitations.
The dynamics of other forms of severe coercion are explored
in detail in the accounts of former Soviet dissident Natan Sha-
ransky." For example, Sharansky notes how it may be possible for a
party subjected to ongoing coercive efforts to appropriate and util-
ize even the most threatening language of a tormenter as his or her
" See infra Section IV (discussing the multiple possible characterizations of the
circumstances of the cases discussed).
" See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
* See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
" See FREDERICK DOUGLAss, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 68-69
(Deborah E. McDowell ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1845).
3 See id. at 69.
" NATAN SHARANsKY, FEAR No EvIL (Stefani Hoffman trans., PublicAffairs 1998)
(1988).
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own, thereby at least momentarily disrupting the coercer's tactics. 4
Sharansky also notes the tendency of his prison interrogators to
present their coercive efforts as mere attempts to thoroughly ex-
plain the legal nature of the circumstances in which Sharansky
found himself.3 5  Again, we understand coercion partly through
logic and language, and partly through history.
Something of the nature of Stalinist coercion is illustrated in a
story told of then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev:
A heckler once interrupted Nikita Khrushchev in the middle of
a speech in which he was denouncing the crimes of Stalin. "You
were a colleague of Stalin's," the heckler yelled, "why didn't you
stop him them?" Khrushchev apparently could not see the
heckler and barked out, "Who said that?" No hand went up.
No one moved a muscle. After a few seconds of tense silence,
Khrushchev finally said in a quiet voice, "Now you know why I
didn't stop him."3 6
Ironically, in this case, we have an example of an unexpressed
but pervasive form of coercion within the context of a denuncia-
tion of systematic coercive abuses.
Literary accounts of coercion, or of attempts at coercion, can
be equally illuminating. Consider, for example, Fanny Price's resis-
tance to the subtle coercive pressures exerted by Henry Crawford
in Jane Austen's Mansfield Park. Coercive social pressure has been
considered an important theme in the work of the great novelist
George Eliot, as well. Among the philosophers, we have the cold-
eyed realism of Niccolo Machiavelli, who famously argued:
[M] en have less hesitation to offend one who makes himself
loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a
chain of obligation, which, because men are wicked, is broken
3 See id. at 40-41.
- See id. at 40-41, 64-65.
3 ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER 73 (1998); see ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE
NEw WORLD (Harper Perennial 1998) (1932); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Clas-
sics 1961) (1949).
" See Joseph M. Duffy, Jr., Moral Integrity and Moral Anarchy in Mansfield Park, 23
ELH 71, 89 (1956);JANEAuSTEN, MANSFIELD PARK (1814), reprinted inJANEAUSTEN:
THE COMPLETE NOVELS 423, 619 (2006); Occurrences of the Words "Per-
suade"/"Persuasion" in the Novel [by Jane Austen] Persuasion,
http://www.pemberley.com/janeinfo/persuasn.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
3 See Blanche Colton Williams, George Eliot: Social Pressure on the Individual, 46
SEWANEE REV. 235, 239 (1938) ("Silas Marner. . . presents a man ruined through
unjust social pressure, restored through the healthy influence of normal human
beings."); see alsoJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 63, 143-46 (Gertrude Himmelfarb
ed., 1974) (1859) (discussing the power and appropriate limits of informal social
pressure).
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at every opportunity for their own utility, but fear is held by a
39dread of punishment that never forsakes you.
Less dramatically, we also have Blaise Pascal's classic sugges-
tion that genuine changes in our attitudes and beliefs can be engi-
neered, albeit benignly, at our own initiative,40 but also by other
parties through familiarization, routine exposure, or desensitiza-
tion toward previously disfavored ideas and practices.
Social scientists have also contributed to the descriptive theory
of coercion, as shown in the classic laboratory obedience experi-
ments of Stanley Milgram.4' Additionally, Solomon Asch's work sub-
tly shows indirect social pressure toward public verbal agreement.42
Regardless of the balance of individuality and conformity we may
expect among public school adolescents, a degree of hierarchical
or authoritative coercion and coercive peer pressure is likely to be
part of any public school environment.
Though hardly religious, some elements of coercion are typi-
cally present in the public schools. After all:
In school, a collection of youngsters comes together for stated
hours each day; the students are expected to be civil to one an-
other, to heed the dominant adult figure(s), and to sit still for
relatively long periods of time so that they can master materials
whose application to their daily lives seems obscure.
9 NICCoL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSEs 61 (Max Lerner ed.,
1950); see GREENE, supra note 36, at 73.
4 See BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 152 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., 1966) (1669).
" See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 178-79 (5th ed., 2009)
(highlighting the robustness of Milgram's results across time and space); STANLEY
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 99-105 (1974) (seemingly normal subjects
were reduced under authority to a mere "agentic" state, in which they instrumen-
tally carried out harmful commands).
" See Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS 9, 70 (1956) (discussing
subtle majority social pressures against the individual's best judgment, depending
in part on whether the lone individual is required to publicly announce his or her
decision to a group of transient (apparent) peers, let alone a hierarchical expert
authority figure, as in Milgram's experiments); Jonah Berger, Identity-Signaling,
Social Influence, and Social Contagion, in UNDERSTANDING PEER INFLUENCE IN
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 181, 184-85 (Mitchell J. Prinstein & Kenneth A. Dodge
eds., 2008); Hart Blanton & Melissa Burkley, Deviance Regulation Theory, in
UNDERSTANDING PEER INFLUENCE IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 94, 95 (Mitchell J.
Prinstein & Kenneth A. Dodge eds., 2008) (providing commentary and context
which emphasizes adolescent peer pressure); see also WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at
189. Again, even a legally anonymous plaintiff may face social pressures and sanc-
tions as much for bringing the suit as they might feel in the moment of any under-
lying religious coercion.
4 HowARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS 135 (2006). We introduce the problem of
the possible justification of some cases of coercion infra at notes 91-94 and accom-
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Below," we will apply what we know about coercion in general
to the specific context of the public school invocation cases," and
by implication to other Establishment Clause contexts. We can
assume that courts take most, though not all, of the above sorts of
broadly-derived insights into account in applying the idea of coer-
cion in the invocation cases. But however courts choose to use the
term "coercion" in Establishment Clause cases, they should have
some grasp of our best philosophical understandings of the idea of
coercion, and at least some response to such understandings where
they reject the logic of the philosophers' most defensible use of the
term. We now turn to a brief consideration of some of the most
important problems raised by the philosophers, as they bear upon
our Establishment Clause cases generally.
III. THE IDEA OF COERCION WITH AN EYE TOWARD THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
A. The Philosophical Concept of Coercion Itself
The most philosophically careful writers about coercion have
noticed that our most useful understandings of the idea of coer-
cion are to one degree or another morally value-laden. At an ex-
treme, one might seek to use the idea of coercion in a compara-
tively value-free way.' On such an approach, deciding whether co-
ercion is present would be largely a matter of uncontroversial em-
pirical observation.' In our terms, party B publicly announces,
initially, her strong intent to do something other than X, but party
A then announces his preference that B do X instead, whereupon
A immediately applies overwhelming physical force to B, or locks B
in a room, thereby realizing A's preference in the matter and
thwarting B's own expressed intention.
panying text. The normative or evaluative qualities built into our understanding
of coercion do not necessarily dictate whether instances of coercion might be
ultimately justified.
" See infra Section IV.
4 See id.
" As we shall explore below in Section III, and have already hinted at above in the
text accompanying note 27, the entirely reasonable idea that coercion itself, ap-
propriately understood, already has the idea of some degree of "wrongness" built
into it-in ways relevant to Establishment Clause jurisprudence-is disastrous for
otherwise attractive coercion theories of the Establishment Clause.
4 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at xi, 7-8.
* Id. at xi.
* See id. at xi.
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In such an extreme case, coercion is said to be present or not
present, as the case may be, primarily as a matter of empirical ob-
servation. Crucially, no normative or evaluative reference is made
to any relevant rights, entitlements, duties, or legitimate expecta-
tions of either party. There may well be reference to resistance on
the part of B to A's coercive efforts, to a comparison between A's
efforts and B's resistance, or perhaps even to whether B's degree of
resistance or lack thereof was either typical or unusual in a purely
statistical sense. At best, we might try to make a non-normative
measurement of any pain inflicted on B. But there will be no con-
cern for whether B's rights were violated, for whether B's degree of
resistance or resolve met some normative baseline degree of rea-
sonableness or adequacy given the identities and abilities of the
parties and the context, or for any other moral considerations.
This sort of approach to coercion thus becomes detached, or un-
hinged, from what we care about in deciding important constitu-
tional cases.
As this discussion suggests, the more typical and generally use-
ful understandings of coercion are, in contrast, thoroughly "moral-
ized" in various ways.o Moral or other normative judgment, includ-
ing enforcement-worthy rights of either party, may enter in various
essential ways, depending partly upon circumstances. Such moral
and other normative judgments may well be controversial. As one
such example, how much personal resistance to a particular effort
to allegedly coerce should be minimally expected of a high school
student will often be controversial in our Establishment Clause in-
vocation cases.
Even this brief discussion should already give us serious con-
cern. If the typically most valuable accounts of coercion are already
crucially moralized, and laden with moral evaluation, including the
interplay of rights and legitimate expectations, values, and interests
under the circumstances, there is a serious analytical problem.
Analysis of coercive efforts, and of whether those coercive efforts
can be morally justified, will involve precisely the same considera-
tions that anyone would sensibly apply in deciding an Establish-
ment Clause case on any reasonable constitutional test. A coercion
analysis adds nothing significant to what we otherwise would have
considered on any reasonable, alternative theory. A coercion analy-
sis is thus, in our contexts, pointless.
5 See id. at xi, 7-8, 258 (noting and further discussing the sheer impracticality, in
most legal contexts, of relatively non-moralized conceptions of coercion). We take
no position on the much broader question of the proper balances between de-
scriptive and evaluative language in formulating constitutional tests in general.
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In sum, our best and most generally useful theories of coer-
cion, and of justified and unjustified coercion, incorporate con-
cerns and elements of any sensible test for the violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. A coercion test duplicates what we would sen-
sibly consider anyway in deciding Establishment Clause cases, in the
absence of a coercion test. It is also possible that whatever we
might reasonably choose to think about in order to resolve our Es-
tablishment Clause cases could be built into some plausible theory
of what coercion, or justified coercion, means in the Establishment
Clause context.- Thus the literal uselessness of any familiar coer-
cion test in these cases is apparent.
B. Coercion, Context, Baselines, and Moralization
To begin to see this, we can start by recognizing that coercion,
or the absence of coercion, is typically a contextual matter." In
general, the law typically recognizes that the presence or absence of
coercion depends on context and circumstance. We can, for the
moment, just assume that coercion is a binary concept-that it is
either present or not present, and does not awkwardly come in de-
grees, for constitutional purposes. On this simplifying assumption,
then, an initial problem is that neither theories of coercion, nor
coercion tests for the violation of the Establishment Clause, can
provide us with a consensual basis for deciding how to conceive of
the relevant context. Contexts may be taken narrowly or broadly.
Even more crucially, what counts as a relevant element of the con-
text, its proper description, and certainly its degree of significance,
will be easily contested by persons who are trying to understand
and apply the idea of coercion in an Establishment Clause case.
Does, for example, a particular formal disclaimer count? For how
much? Here in particular, looking to the idea of coercion to clarify
or simplify the proper adjudication of Establishment Clause cases is
already, to this extent, a useless endeavor.
But let us move beyond such matters. Some of the further un-
avoidable uncertainties of any coercion analysis involve problems of
' See infra Section III.B-D.
* See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 184 ("[C]oercion claims are emphatically
and technically contextual.").
" See id. at 172 ("In determining what counts as a reasonable alternative [in the
context of arguably coercive choice situations], the law adopts a contextual and
moralized approach."); see also id. at 189 ("In some cases, informal pressures are
sufficient to coerce; in other cases, only those pressures sufficient to negate re-
sponsibility are coercive.").
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choosing a "baseline"5 4 position from which to evaluate B's status,
when B is allegedly subjected to coercive influence by A. B's base-
line may be, on some theories of coercion, a matter of B's current
actual welfare; B's currently recognized rights and entitlements; or
an even more explicitly normative baseline, such as what B has or
should have a right to expect, whether anyone currently recognizes
those rights or not." To choose a proper baseline, we would inevi-
tably be drawing upon the same sorts of considerations that already
drive debate, apart from the idea of coercion, in the Establishment
Clause cases.
We have also already seen that the leading theorists of coer-
cion in general disagree among themselves on the crucial issue of
whether persons purportedly exercising coercion must intend to be
exercising coercion. Perhaps not just the coercive influence itself,
but the intent on the part of A to exercise coercion may be a matter
of degree. But essentially these debates are again already built into
Establishment Clause jurisprudence on other theories.
In the public school invocation and commencement cases, the
question of intent is already debated on any familiar Establishment
Clause theory, including the first prong of the Lemon test and the
O'Connor Endorsement test. 5  Certainly, a school may argue that
its institutional intention is not to coerce anyone, even through the
foreseeable adverse reactions of witnesses and others toward any
non-conformists. What coercion tests might phrase in terms of
whether a government indirectly or subtly coerces anyone merely
reflects standard concerns over significant state purposes" and
primary effects" under Lemon, or the government's intent and its
- See generally id. at 204, 211. Professor Wertheimer goes on to argue that
"[r]elative to one's baseline, a threat reduces one's available options whereas an
offer increases them." Id. at 211. We shall herein avoid the largely irrelevant
question of coercive offers. See, e.g., Robert Stevens, Coercive Offers, 66
AUSTRALASIANJ. PHIL. 83 (1988). But whether we are being coerced or not, and
the degree of any coercion involved, is typically at least as much a matter of the
absolute and the relative value of the options available to B as it is the sheer num-
ber of such options. See, e.g., CHRISTINE SWANTON, FREEDOM: A COHERENCE THEORY
80, 162 (1992).
5 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 211.
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text; BAYLEs, supra note 11, at 19, 20 (a
coercer must intend the coercive effect).
57 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose. . . .").
" See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 690 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring)
(referring to the government's actual, as well as perceived, intent).
5 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (stating the first prong of the test, the "purpose"
prong).
6 See id. (stating the second prong of the test, the "effect" prong).
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reasonably perceived intent6 under an Endorsement Test. Again,
coercion tests offer us no distinctive benefit.
Do coercion tests perhaps offer a distinctive advantage in di-
recting our attention to whether B, the alleged coercee, had no
reasonable choice but to act in accordance with A's wishes?63 Alan
Wertheimer writes that "having 'no acceptable alternative' but to
succumb to a coercive proposal is . . . a necessary condition of be-
ing coerced, but that it, too, is a moralized condition."" Whether a
supposedly coerced person has an "acceptable" alternative requires
our separate judgment about what should be considered accept-
able. This problem in coercion theory combines elements of our
concerns above for context and circumstance, for choosing a
proper "baseline"" condition for B, as well as for the broader ines-
67capably "moralized" character of the very idea of coercion.
Coercion theorists who write of the lack of any reasonable al-
ternative to the coerced choice must try to offer some account of
this condition. Typically, the focus is on the choice of conforming
as markedly superior68 to the threatened alternative, or considera-
bly greater69 in its utility, with the threatened alternative being in-
eligible for B as a reasonable, normal person.70 Typically, though,
these considerations will involve choosing from among the same
normative assumptions and baseline possibilities already at work in
other theories in the relevant Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In the invocation cases, clearly, discussion of the expectations held
of children and adolescents with respect to their alternatives and
" See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the "pur-
pose" prong in the context of the Endorsement test).
6 See id. (O'Connor,J., concurring) (referring to the "effect" prong in the context
of the Endorsement test).
63 We set aside the question of whether this clam about coercion is actually true on
the best theory of coercion.
64 WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 267.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
6' See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
68 WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 193.
6' David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL.& PUB. AFF. 121-24 (1981).
70 KRiuSAN KRISTJANSSON, SOCIAL FREEDOM: THE RESPONSIBILTY VIEW 51 (1996).
Instead, one could look at the incentives or choices themselves as either reason-
able or unreasonable. See, e.g., Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION 30,
32 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 2007) (1972) ("A man who acts
voluntarily, but only because of some unreasonable incentives, does not act
freely.").
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any appropriate fortitude or resistance to peer pressure is present
in any serious theory."
C. Children, Heroes, Martyrs, Saints, and Failed Coercion
The inescapably normative character of discussions of coer-
cion is highlighted by the fact that, occasionally, persons subject to
coercive pressure successfully resist where most would say there was
no reasonable alternative to compliance. A plaintiff adolescent in a
public school commencement case should certainly still have stand-
ing even if he or she conspicuously avoids or ignores the invoca-
tion, and perhaps re-enters for the remainder of the program, with
minimal concern for the disapproval of others. Such an adolescent
might be considered a reduced-scale version of a hero, martyr,nor
saint, as in the cases, arguably, of Joan of Arc, 3 Thomas Becket,74
Thomas More,75 Galileo,76 or Oscar Romero." The reduced-scale
student hero, martyr, or saint also raises the conceptual problem of
whether there can be failed coercion or perhaps only failed at-
tempts at coercion. Whether a particular school can be constitu-
tionally guilty of religious coercion under a coercion test may hinge
on how we choose to resolve this problem. Some coercion theorists
appear to argue that, by definition, coercion must be successful, in
that a coerced party must do the coercer's bidding." If B does not
" See generally, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
1 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 197.
7 See, e.g., MARK TWAIN, JOAN OFARC (Ignatius Press 1989) (1896).
7 See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 69 (1935) ("Death will come only
when I am worthy, And if I am worthy, there is no danger."); id. at 74 ("[M]y
whole being gives entire consent.").
7 See, e.g., ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 141 (Vintage Books 1990)
(1962) ("We must stand fast a little-even at the risk of being heroes."); id. at 121
("I can't give in, Howard. You might as well advise a man to change the color of
his eyes.").
76 For the case of Galileo, see MAURIcE A. FINOCCHIARO, THE GALILEW AFFAIR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1989); ERNAN MCMULLIN, THE CHURCH AND GALILEO
(2005); THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GALILEO (Peter K. Machamer ed., 1998).
1 See, e.g., JAMES R. BROCKMAN, ROMERO: A LIfE (rev. ed. 1989).
78 See, e.g., BAY, supra note 11, at 93 (defining coercion as "the application of actual
physical violence, or . .. sanctions sufficiently strong to make the individual abandon a
course of action or inaction dictated by his own strong and enduring motives and wishes");
Bayles, supra note 11, at 17 ("[C]oercion involves both the success of the coercer
and in some sense the voluntary action of the person coerced."); Virginia Held,
Coercion and Coercive Offers, in COERCION 49, 50-51 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 2007) (1972) ("Coercion is the activity of causing someone to do
something against his will, or of bringing about his doing what he does against his
will.").
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comply, then B supposedly cannot possibly have been coerced.
Other theorists appear to disagree and argue that, in some sense,
genuine coercion may or may not succeed. 9
There may be cases in which A coerces B merely for the sake of
"toying" with B, as it were. In such cases, A may simply delight in
the coercing of B, without much caring whether B does what avoids
a heavy penalty, or instead actually suffers the heavy penalty A im-
poses. But these cases will be unusual in the religion clause area.
If a coercion theory were to distinctively contribute to our pub-
lic school invocation cases, it would, at a minimum, have to offer
one view or another of whether genuine coercion can be unsuc-
cessful in exacting B's compliance. The special problem here,
from our perspective, is that the established case law already inde-
pendently knows the right answer, even before the divided coer-
cion theorists arrive at a consensus on this point. Consider again
the case of the scaled-down adolescent hero who, respectfully but
conspicuously, declines to participate in an invocation knowing
that he or she will thereby incur, perhaps as intended or foreseen
by the school, some real and substantial cost beyond mere discom-
fort. On any sensible approach, such a student has standing,"
whether the coercion theorists wish to say that she was coerced or
not. The coercion analysis would again, and at best, add nothing.
Actually, some of the disagreement among coercion theorists
in this regard may be largely verbal. We would, of course, not
normally say that B was coerced into doing X unless B had actually
done X. But as the cases of the heroes, martyrs, and saints, secular
and otherwise, illustrate, objectionable religious coercion by the
government is not confined to cases of actual compliance. In cases
of non-compliance or unsuccessful government coercion, we might
still say that the government directly or indirectly exerted coercive
pressure; or encouraged coercive pressure; or took advantage of
See, e.g., Gert, supra note 70, at 37 (referring to cases in which a person is being
coerced to do X but does not do it, in spite of the coercing). More ambiguously,
see Pennock, supra note 11, at 8 ("[I]t is certainly true that we say 'He tried to
coerce me into doing X, but I refused.' He only tried; he did not succeed.");
Westen, supra note 11, at 561-63; James Stacey Taylor, Autonomy, Duress, and Coer-
cion, in AUTONOMY 127, 134-35 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2003) (discussing
the views of Harry Frankfurt).a On our assumption, a student with exceptional fortitude has chosen a path of
non-compliance at commencement, following her conscientiously held beliefs, at
whatever social price may then be exacted. Returning to our more dramatically
heroic examples above, presumably the estate of a martyr officially executed on
grounds of religious unorthodoxy would have standing to object on something
like Establishment Clause (and free exercise, and free speech) grounds, even
though the executed party never betrayed her religious principles.
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coercive circumstances; or subjected B to coercive influence; or was
somehow responsible for coercive influences, whether those influ-
ences were successful or not. We could, in some such cases, very
defensibly find standing and an Establishment Clause violation
even as we wait for coercion theorists to reach consensus on this
point.
D. Coercion, a Right to Coerce, and justified Coercion
Our concern for context, for assigning a proper "baseline"
condition for those subjected to coercion, and for the "moralized"
character of inquiries into coercion lead us to a further problem
for supposedly distinctively useful coercion tests in our Establish-
ment Clause cases. Ordinarily, the law holds that A cannot possibly
be coercing B if A is acting as A has a right to do."' To the extent
that this is so, or that coercion theorists assume it to be so, the in-
dependent value of a coercion test in our Establishment Clause
cases is again nullified. The problem for coercion theories here is
quite clear. In order to decide whether the government's activity
counts as coercion, we must first ask whether the government had a
right to act as it did, under the circumstances, toward the public
school students involved. And this is, of course, a matter ultimately
addressed by other, competing theories of the Establishment
Clause.
This is a matter of the highest importance. A coercion test for
Establishment Clause cases must adopt some appropriate "baseline"
for party B, which implies some limitations on the state's conduct.
But setting B's appropriate "baseline" normally "would require
nothing less than a complete moral and political theory ... ."" The
coercion test advocate obviously cannot possibly short-circuit this
broad inquiry by looking to the student's constitutional rights un-
der the circumstances. That would obviously be question-begging.
The point of a coercion test is to discover the respective constitu-
tional rights of the school and of any dissenting students; it is not
" See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 287 ("[T]he moral baseline account of
coercive proposals explains why it is (ordinarily) not legally recognizable coercion
to threaten to do something one has a right to do."), 172 ("It is ordinarily not
coercion if A proposes to do what he has an independent legal right to do, so long
as the right is not abused or used for purposes that the law considers illegiti-
mate."), 201 (citing for this basic point the work of the philosopher Robert
Nozick);Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 84
(1981) ("[T]rue duress or coercion results when one's rights are violated by oth-
ers-something not always present when one has a hard choice to make under
pressure.").
" WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 217.
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meant to assume the contours of those constitutional rights at the
beginning of the analysis.
Related to this point, one well-known theorist holds that to
know whether coercion is present or not, one must consider the
"amount of evil""' that would flow from both complying and not
complying with the acts the school is arguably seeking to coerce,
and whether any violations of a moral rule would thereby be in-
volved. The bottom line here is that in such a coercion "test" for
Establishment Clause violations, determining the very presence or
absence of coercion itself involves many of the same, if not even
broader, moral inquiries as are involved in Establishment Clause
cases on any reasonable theory.85
By way of further example, consider applying either the first
two prongs of the Lemon test 6 or the O'Connor Endorsement test
in a typical public school commencement invocation case. Now,
perhaps either or both of these tests could reach constitutionally
defensible results without having to undertake the entire broad
inquiry into rights and morality required by the idea of coercion
itself.8  That would amount to a dramatic advantage over tests
based on the idea of coercion.
But realistically, the Lemon test and the Endorsement test, in
our case, implicitly require some sort of moral inquiry. In a typical
public school invocation case, as in many other Establishment
Clause cases, the school and any dissenting students may jointly be
able to cite a number of arguable purposes and principal effects of
the invocation, and then debate their significance.8 9 At some point,
beyond debating matters of credibility, sincerity, and observable
fact, moral judgments concerning the respective rights and legiti-
mate authority of the parties would be made under the familiar
Establishment Clause tests. As merely one example, normative
judgments would be made under the Endorsement test, in particu-
lar, as to whether any dissenting students can reasonably consider
themselves, because of the invocation in question, to be second-
- 90class citizens, or outsiders in their own community.
83 Gert, supra note 70, at 43.
84 See id.
* See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 8.
8 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (discussing the secular
legislative purpose test and the primary effects test).
1 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
* See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
8 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
" See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
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Thus again all reasonable Establishment Clause tests must oc-
casionally involve controversial, basic moral judgments. If any-
thing, coercion tests will often involve broader, deeper, and more
controversial moral judgments than some competing Establishment
Clause tests. At the very most, coercion tests offer to the courts no
advantage in this regard.
Beyond this crucial result, there are further good grounds for
concluding that coercion tests are plagued with distinct, additional
problems. The problem, here in particular, is that many coercion
theorists sensibly conclude that however gravely objectionable co-
ercion in general may be, coercion may in some cases be morally9'
justified." The additional constitutional problem then seems clear:
If the relevant sort of coercion in the public school invocation cases
can sometimes be morally justified, it is, at the very least, hard to
see why such coercion should always imply a constitutional viola-
tion. What started out as a coercion test-whatever the variety of
coercion test we may choose-becomes an even murkier, more
complex, and less independent unjustified coercion test.
If we find an instance of coercion to be truly unjustified, the
lack of justification for the coercion, and not the finding of coer-
cion itself, may thus be doing most of the important constitutional
work. However, if we find the instance of coercion to be morally
justified, it is, at best, unclear why the school's action should always,
or even sometimes, be held unconstitutional. Would a coercion
test in this area ever find genuine governmental coercion, but then
apply, say, strict scrutiny?9 3 What would then count as a state inter-
" Again, if the justification were assumed to be constitutional, rather than moral,
the case would already be over, in favor of the state.
92 See, e.g., Bayles, supra note 11, at 25 ("[C]oercion might produce goods of
greater value than the freedom in question."); Held, supra note 78, at 61
("[C]oercion is not always wrong (quite obviously: one coerces the small child not
to run across the highway, or the murderer to drop his weapon) . . . ."); Held,
supra note 78, at 62 (noting the role of coercion in pollution control, safety regula-
tions, and more generally in matters of justice and fairness); Pennock, supra note
11, at 10 ("[I]t is ... obvious that in many situations coercion is justified."); Wolff,
supra note 14, at 145 ("[T]he evil of coercing men is frequently outweighed by the
good which flows from the coercion."); Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion, and
the Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of an End to the Wandering of a Wayward
Judiciary, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917, 958 (1993) ("[S]ome government actions,
coercing as they must, are acceptable and others are not."); see also BAY, supra note
11, at 94. But cf BAY, supra note 11, at 94 ("Coercion can be justified only if it
serves to reduce the occurrence of worse kinds of coercion.").
. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussing
the basic logic behind a strict scrutiny test in a racial classification case).
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est sufficient to justify the religious coercion in question?94  The
coercion test itself would be contributing little.
Part of the deep, underlying problem is that if we are con-
cerned about the freedom of religion, or the freedom of con-
science, of potentially dissenting students (or about freedom or
liberty in general) we must recognize the inevitable limits of the
idea of coercion. Coercion, as it is typically understood, may well
be, as the late philosopher and theorist of coercion Robert Nozick
discussed, a narrower idea than that of being made unfree or being
denied liberty, whether in the religious realm or not.9 5 And free-
dom or lack of freedom itself may be constitutionally important.
This would further limit the usefulness of a coercion test in the
Establishment Clause area. Overall, then, any possibility of any dis-
tinctive usefulness of a coercion test in the Establishment Clause
area has by now dissolved.
IV. THE PUBLIC SCHOOL INVOCATION CASES AND THE IDEA OF
COERCION
A. Lee v. Weisman and Coercion
The epicenter of coercion-based analyses in the Establishment
Clause cases, and certainly in our public school invocation cases, is
the majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman, written by Justice Kennedy."
9 See generally Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County
Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 597 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing constitutionally permissi-
ble forms of coercion, and stating: "[S]chool administrators can 'coerce' student
action of all kinds without engaging in unconstitutional coercion; they can even
require student contributions to a fund that ultimately supports a religious organi-
zation without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.") (citing Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841-46 (1995))).
5 See ROBERT NoziCK, SocRATic PuzzLEs 15 (1997) ("[C]oercion ... does not ex-
haust the range of nonliberty or unfreedom."); see also supra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
96 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-99 (1992). Justice Kennedy's analysis,
present in his majority opinion for the Court, has been the source of much com-
mentary. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rehnquist Court: Religion and the Rehnquist
Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 145, 162 (2004) ("The key to the prayers for Kennedy was
coercion. Graduation ceremonies may not be formally mandatory, but in practical
terms attendance is regarded as obligatory. Students who have to stand or bow
their heads during a prayer might feel coerced into signaling acceptance of prac-
tices in which they do not believe."); Paulsen, supra note 2, at 25-48 (commented
upon by Ronald C. Kahn, God Save Us From the Coercion Test: ConstitutiveDecisionmak-
ing, Polity Principles, and Religious Freedom, 43 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 983 (1993));
Kristin J. Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the
Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 147, 177-83 (1994);
Cynthia V. Ward, Essay, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C.
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Lee involved a public school administration's invitation to a rabbi in
the Providence, Rhode Island area to deliver a brief and purport-
edly non-sectarian17 invocation and benediction at a middle-school
commencement ceremony. An initial complication arises: Public
school prayers are sometimes led by members of specific religious
denominations that cannot plausibly be said to be politically domi-
nant within the jurisdiction in question. Any coercion in Lee must,
therefore, take some subtler form than that of the area's dominant
religious denomination seeking, briefly, to allegedly coerce non-
adherents. The speaker may, of course, perceive the prayer as non-
sectarian," with the potentially coerced parties consisting, in part,
of persons with no serious personal objections to the content of the
prayer itself, but mainly to its recitation in a coercive context."
Given the brevity of the prayers, 00 it would be difficult to argue
that they might prompt religious conversions through the persua-
sive force of the rhetoric or any argument they embodied. While
the commencement ceremony was not in any formal sense a matter
of required attendance,'01 there was socially-induced pressure or
expectation of attendance. 02 The problem here is, again, that of
proper baseline setting.' Given the relevant circumstances, does
the pressure to attend-perhaps applied in part by the govern-
DAvis L. REv. 1621, 1659-61 (2006); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) ("Although our precedents make clear that proof of government coer-
cion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient.");
Lee, 505 U.S. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[L]aws that coerce nonadherents to
'support or participate in any religion or its exercise' would virtually by definition
violate their right to religious free exercise." (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 659-60 (1989) (internal citation omitted))).
9 Lee, 505 U.S. at 581. A moment's reflection should make clear that the idea of a
neutral, non-sectarian, or even an inclusive prayer is incoherent and certainly
unattainable. Instead, a prayer might be said to be, at most, relatively neutral,
non-sectarian, or inclusive only by a contemporary version of broad Lockean lib-
eral standards; broadly, Lockean liberal standards are familiar, but are hardly
religiously neutral. SeeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIsES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETrER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 211 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) (1689).
" See Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.
9 By analogy, we can imagine, say, registered Democratic party parents objecting
to coerced attendance at, or participation in, official public school endorsements
of the Democratic Party. In this constitutional context, we need take no position
on whether any coercion can be involved in being forced or required to do what
one would otherwise wish to do.
100 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 583.
10 Id.
' See id. at 586 ("Even for those students who object to the religious exercise, their
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair
and real sense obligatory. ... ").
"3 See supra Section III.B.
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ment, or merely somehow taken advantage of by the government-
amount to (unjustifiable) coercion?
Realistically, judicial opinions are unlikely to provide convinc-
ing answers to questions that continue to divide the leading special-
ist philosophers. In Lee, Justice Kennedy asserted, "It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that gov-
ernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in relig-
ion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." 04 Under the
circumstances in Lee, Justice Kennedy concludes that genuine coer-
cion is also crucially present in subtle social pressures0 5 such that a
student may have had no real alternative which would have allowed
her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation. 06
Justice Kennedy emphasizes not only the subtlety, but the indi-
rectness and the multiple sources,' 7 including peers and other so-
cial influences, of the coercion held to have been present.'o" The
government's involvement in the ceremony itself, from start to fin-
ish, presumably establishes sufficient state responsibility" for the
coercive pressures exerted by non-governmental actors, given the
general foreseeability of peero and other social pressures, whether
the government intended or welcomed such coercive pressures or
not. The coercion theorist must resolve whether the school, in the
invocation context, must itself have intended to exercise (coercive)
influence, at least indirectly, for its acts to violate the Establishment
Clause. If one or more peers or audience members intend to im-
pose some informal social cost on a dissenting student, would the
intent underlying that social disapproval always be attributable also
to the school?
'" Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984)).
o0 See id. at 588, 592.
'* Id. at 588.
" 7 See id. at 592-93
10 See id.
'*While there is clearly sufficient state action in general for Section 1983 pur-
poses, it will often be debatable whether the school can be sufficiently linked to
any alleged coercive pressure of private persons, even those required to be pre-
sent, or of mere audience members. For background, see generally R. George
Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 685 (1989).
"0 See supra note 42.
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We have already seen the general philosophical dispute over
the extent to which coercion requires at least some form of in-
tent."" At the level of a simple hypothetical philosophical case, it
seems plausible to argue that A does not coerce B in unintention-
ally locking B in a room-both the intent and any relevant purpose
on the part of A seem to be missing. But the typical public school
invocation cases will, in this respect, be far murkier on the question
of intent. Suppose there is little evidence in the record that the
school anticipated or welcomed not just mild social disapproval of
any dissenter, but sufficient social disapproval as to rise to the level
of coercion. Should the court nonetheless find sufficient intent on
the part of the government to hold the government's actions coer-
cive? Or to sufficiently partake of private efforts at coercion? Jus-
tice Kennedy actually seems to impose some sort of government
intent requirement."'
Justice Kennedy then turns to the issue of the religious ele-
ment of the purported coercion. As formulated by Justice Ken-
nedy, the problem takes this form: "What to most believers may
seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever
respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to
the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the ma-
chinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy."'12 The cir-
cumstances in which a "respectful silence""'3 will differ from mere
neutral silence, without any clear inference of respect or lack of
respect, seem too subtle for consistently accurate judicial resolu-
tion, especially on appeal. But it is also debatable whether the reli-
gious practitioners in this kind of case are always seeking the re-
spect of non-believers or believing separationists for their religious
practices."'4 The idea of respect in this sense may not realistically
capture the actual capacities of all middle school students to begin
"oSee supra notes 15, 56 and accompanying text.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 594. Some cases may allow for application of the idea that the
school is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of its own inten-
tional acts, including consequences of a coercive character. See generally Harris v.
Richards, 867 P.2d 325 (Kan. 1994) (imputing an intent to injure from the in-
sured's action, firing two shots from a shotgun into a dark car). ButJustice Ken-
nedy may be imposing a stronger government intent, or at least a conscious utiliza-
tion, requirement in arguing that "government may no more use social pressure to
enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means." Lee, 505 U.S. at 594. It
seems possible that a school might not have intended coercion at the time of the
invocation ceremony, but then have encouraged or done nothing to discourage an
unanticipated negative reaction to a protesting student.
"'Id. at 592.
"' Id. at 593.
". Id. at 592.
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with. But even if so, some of the religious practitioners in question
may not really be seeking respect for some discrete two minute re-
ligious practice, or even for the religious beliefs underlying that
practice. Instead, the presumed desire for respect in question may,
in some cases, be less religious than person-oriented, classmate-to-
classmate solidaristic, sentimental, or collegial.
Perhaps the idea in such a case is sometimes more like: mini-
mally respect me, for two minutes, merely as a fellow student with
shared experiences, whatever my beliefs or practices may be on this
occasion. Of course, the non-believers or separationists could
equally make similar, essentially secular, arguments in favor of re-
spect flowing in their own direction. But in such cases, we would
then have conflicting, basically secular, arguments about coercion,
divisiveness, deference, collegiality, or majority and minority rights,
with no essential reference to religion or the establishment thereof.
Whether any passive dissenter's inactivity could reasonably be
construed as voluntary endorsement of a religious practice is partly
a matter of a sensitive understanding of context and convention,"1
along with the judicial choice of how best to moralize the idea of
coercion in that context."6 Even more specifically, a coercion test
must eventually decide how much, if any, weight to attach to official
disclaimers"'7 that indicate silence or passivity should not be con-
strued as agreement with the prayer in question."8 Again, the area
is sufficiently complex, contextualist, and particularist to discour-
age confidence in appellate judicial resolutions.
Ironically, though, the clearer the evidence that any silence or
passivity is being coerced, the less reasonable it is to infer that any
dissenter actually believes in the content of the prayer, or has
abandoned separationism. The greater and more obvious the co-
ercion, the less can be inferred of any coercee's genuine beliefs."9
"'Just as silence in some well-defined contexts may indicate voluntary consent, so
elsewhere, silence may equally clearly indicate resentment or uncommitment and
non-involvement. Whether appellate courts are especially good at making these
subtle distinctions is, again, questionable.
11' See supra Section III.B.
"1 For discussion of some difficult issues in the legal status and value of disclaimers
generally, see R. George Wright, Your Mileage May Vary: A General Theory of Legal
Disclaimers, 7 PIERCE L. REv. 85 (2008).
"' For an argument that a (presumably sincere) disclaimer would suffice to allay
any misperceptions in this regard, see Lee, 505 U.S. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
" 9 For a similar observation, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 719, 721-22
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legally mandatory display of a
state motto on a license plate gives us no grounds to infer the actual state of mind
of any individual automobile driver).
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Of course, this should hardly allay a dissenter's concerns over coer-
cion. There remains the sheer indignityn'o and, even over a minute
or two, possible vulnerability to outside influence that can be inter-
preted as improper.12 ' But the problem of whether perceived coer-
cion, or subjectively felt coercion, should be treated as actual coer-
cion for Establishment Clause purposes remains real and daunting,
on any coercion theory.
On justice Kennedy's own approach, "[t]here can be no doubt
that for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act
of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation
in the rabbi's prayer."'2 2  At least in the absence of sufficiently
credible disclaimers, Justice Kennedy's approach would view a dis-
senting student's only path to retaining religious integrity as requir-
ing not just silence, but some visible and recognizable protest.12
But any such protest, whatever its possible legal significance, would
typically be discouraged by peer or other social pressure.1
As to the question of whether an instance of religious coercion
can, on some further test, ever be constitutionally justified, Justice
Kennedy does use the phrase "unacceptable constraint."2 5 But it is
left unclear by Justice Kennedy whether this phrase signals a dis-
tinction between constitutionally justified and unjustified coercion.
Middle school authorities, of course, exercise presumably justified,
but non-religious, coercion of all students on a recurring basis.
Could any religious coercion ever be justified in a school setting,
assuming that the circumstances in Lee count as coercive?
'2 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
" On one hand, most coercive plots to steer the students' thinking would likely
require more than a minute or two of vaguely theological references almost liter-
ally as the student is walking out the door. But on the other hand, such students
may be at an especially vulnerable time and an especially vulnerable age, with little
or no personal experience with formal public ceremonies and correspondingly
little sense of how to process them. Again, it may often be difficult to envision
appellate courts as especially well-qualified to moralize or generally flesh out and
give substance to any particular theory of coercion, and then apply that theory in
context.
'2 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
' See id.
121 See id. at 593-94 (citing social science peer-pressure literature).
1'Id. at 594; see also Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 597 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating "school administra-
tors can 'coerce' student action of all kinds without engaging in unconstitutional
coercion; they can even require student contributions to a fund that ultimately
supports a religious organization without running afoul of the Establishment
Clause.") (citing Rosenberger v. Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841-46
(1995)).
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Imagine, perhaps, an incident of natural disaster or serious
violence at a rural middle school, in which the school promptly
asks for the presence of grief counselors, 2 6 most of whom turn out
to be religiously affiliated; the school then immediately provides
grieving students with grief counselors with no consideration given
to religion. Suppose that a grief counselor suggests that a grieving
student pray, or listen in respectful silence to a vague prayer. As-
suming that religious coercion is present, could the school's role in
the coercion in this rare instance ever be constitutionally justified?
The problems of indirect or largely social and non-organized
coercion, as well as of coercion's possible justifiability, have long
been of general concern within the liberal tradition. John Stuart
Mill's work 2 7 is doubtless the best known within this tradition. Ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy's approach in Lee, a student in the
plaintiffs position is not free 28 to absent herself from the middle
school graduation ceremony. The dissenting student's perceived
conformity "was too high an exaction to withstand the test of the
Establishment Clause."" Whether Justice Kennedy means to sug-
gest that all deprivation of freedom in this context must also
amount to coercion is unclear. Pronouncing the cost to the dis-
senter to be too high'3 ' is nevertheless a matter of setting a baseline
and of a moralized fleshing out of the concept of coercion by the
Court.
Actually, Justice Kennedy's chosen baseline and his chosen
form of moralization of the idea of coercion are controversial even
by the classic, but vague, standards ofJohn Stuart Mill. Mill, whose
doctrine admittedly focuses on mature adults as distinct from
school children,"' recognizes the difficulties in drawing lines, even
on general principles, given the complications and conflicting in-
126or background, see Mary Jean Dolan, Government-Sponsored Chaplains and Crisis:
Walking the Fine Line in Disaster Response and Daily Life, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505
(2008).
'" See generally MI±, supra note 38; see also Alan Ryan, Mr. McCloskey on Mill's Liberal-
ism, 14 PHIL. Q. 253, 254 (1964) ("Mill's concern in On Liberty is not for the indi-
vidual against the State, but rather for the individual against all forms of social
pressure....").
2 8 Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.
"Id. at 598.
"See the discussion by NozIcK, supra note 95, suggesting that, generally, coercion
does not exhaust the scope of all deprivations of freedom. See also supra notes 17-
19 and accompanying text.
' Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
' MIuL, supra note 38, at 69. For personal background involving the social re-
sponse to Mill's relationship with Harriet Taylor, see JOHN STUART MILL,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Penguin Books 1990) (1873).
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terests. Mill famously recognizes that the social tyranny of majority
sentiment, even without the conscious support of the state, can in
some ways be especially coercive.' Such a social tyranny, "though
not usually upheld by . .. extreme penalties, ... leaves fewer means
of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life,
and enslaving the soul itself." 13 4 Presumably a social tyranny of the
majority over adolescents, when supported, incited, or taken advan-
tage of by a public school administration, can be even more coer-
cive.
But on the other hand, Mill is also deeply interested, for both
children and adults, in the development of firm, resilient, steadfast,
and persevering individual character.35 As an empirical matter,
there may sometimes be a tradeoff between promoting such char-
acter and invariably shielding even middle school or high school
children from exposure to brief prayers at commencement.
As well, Mill holds that those private persons who disapprove
of dissenting beliefs and behaviors have a right to act on that dis-
approval, in ways short of punitiveness or coordination with gov-
ernment sanction.13 The social majority is, according to Mill, gen-
erally within its rights in discreetly refusing to associate with a dis-
senter; the heart of Mill's conclusion is that:
We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavor-
able opinion of anyone, not to the oppression of his individual-
ity, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example,
to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to pa-
rade the avoidance) .... We have a right, and it may be our
duty, to caution others against him if we think his example or
conversation likely to have a pernicious effect ... . [H]e suffers
these penalties only in so far as they are the natural and ...
spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because
they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punish-
137ment.
Mill is plainly seeking some sort of balanced view regarding
purely private or social disapproval of the dissenter. Line-drawing
here at the level of principle will be difficult. Presumably, we may
' MILL, supra note 38, at 69.
" See id. at 63.
See generally John Stuart Mill, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 10,
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/.
'MId. at 144-47.
' MILL, supra note 38, at 144, 177.
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appropriately communicate our disapproval to the dissenter and
the dissenter's potential associates, but we must not parade13 our
disapproval. Even if this line between communicating and parad-
ing can be drawn in theory, we must ask whether, with respect to
social coercion, it is the right line. Or again, according to Mill, the
dissenter's actions may legitimately evoke social penalties, 39 but not
social punishment.o4 0 How useful, in theory or practice, will a social
penalty versus social punishment distinction be? Factoring in the
ways in which a public school might then promote, or take advan-
tage of, such a social reaction in a religious context then com-
pounds the uncertainties and the persisting controversies.
Public prayer in a public school context is, of course, a very
different and special case. But Mill implicitly recognizes that even
the indignities, upset, and alienation engendered by similar such
occasions may be part of a necessary and important broader con-
flict of values. Minimizing in every context the pain of a mutual
clash of world views may, to Mill, come at the eventual price of re-
duced intellectual progress.' 4' Professor Jeremy Waldron writes
that:
Ethical confrontation, we have seen, is a positive good for Mill:
it improves people and promotes progress. But ethical confron-
tation is not a painless business. It always hurts to be contra-
dicted in debate, if one takes seriously the views one is pro-
pounding .... If nobody is disturbed, distressed, or hurt in this
way, that is a sign that ethical confrontation is not taking place,
and . . . that the intellectual life and progress of our civilization
may be grinding to a halt.4 2
In summary, we may say that the ideas of coercion, and of un-
justified coercion, are applied by Justice Kennedy in Lee in an ex-
pansive, encompassing way. The basic problem is that this ap-
proach, however defensible, is certainly not required by the idea of
coercion itself. The idea of coercion is equally susceptible to rea-
sonable alternative readings 143 and case outcomes. We can of
' Id.
"Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 115, 124 (1993).
1o Id. at 144.
"' Id. at 94-98.
"'Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 115, 124 (1993).
"3 See Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation, 53
ST. Louis U. L.J. 417, 483 (2009) ("As currently described, it is impossible to know
whether the coercion test is very forgiving, very demanding, or somewhere in be-
tween."). Actually, the idea of coercion cannot be reduced to any of these alterna-
tives, singly or in combination.
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course hardly fault a judicial opinion writer for failing to solve
problems, even in a specific context, left unresolved by generations
of specialist philosophers. But our properly limited expectations of
what the courts can accomplish" do not make the idea of coercion
useful as the basis of an Establishment Clause test.
B. The Coercion Issue in Santa Fe and Beyond
The later case of Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe14 5 in-
volved several factual departures from Lee, but Justice Stevens's
opinion for the majority largely tracked that of Justice Kennedy in
Lee.'4 6 Santa Fe involved a Texas public high school football game,
rather than a middle school commencement, and an invocation
that was insulated from school authorities by means of an author-
ized student majority vote to allow for some sort of pre-game sol-
emnization, and then a separate student majority vote to select a
particular student speaker.14 7
Interestingly, the Court in Sante Fe ignored one consideration
that could arguably have been relevant to their coercion analysis.
The Court referred to a prior invocation at a commencement
ceremony in which the student began the invocation ceremony
with the words, "Please bow you heads."'a Of course, the superfi-
cial form of "Please bow your heads" is compatible with that of a
mere polite request, subject to refusal without any explicitly threat-
ened penalty. But the superficial grammar of the phrase carries us
'"Some critics find no judicial choice among obvious alternative readings of coer-
cion in Lee. See, e.g., id. Justice Kennedy makes something of a start in that regard;
the more basic problem is that he could just as well have elaborated a coercion test
in various other ways. Justice Scalia characterizes Justice Kennedy's general ap-
proach as involving "a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychologi-
cal coercion." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Yet Justice Scalia seems to conclude that a simple written disclaimer would solve
the coercion problem. See id. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One must ask
whether Justice Scalia's disclaimer approach is, on his view, genuinely well-
justified, in which case the coercion test deserves more credit than Justice Scalia
accords to it, or whether it is merely an equal and opposite manipulation to that of
Justice Kennedy, in which case the specific approaches and applications of both
Justice Kennedy and Scalia would seem arbitrary. The more basic and distinctive
problem is that the idea of coercion itself, let alone justified or unjustified coer-
cion, must be fleshed out in one way or another with considerations taken into
account on any sensible alternative theory of the Establishment Clause.
'4'530 U.S. 290 (2000).
'"See id. at 301-02, 312 (quoting key passages from Lee).
See id. at 303-07, 310.
"Id. at 295 n.2.
220 [Vol. 41:2
2011] COERCION TESTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CIAUSE
only so far.'4 9 While most commands are not preceded by Please-
"Please drop your weapons" is striving for an effect-some are:
Mass-transit commuters are familiar with (often) automated re-
quests "Please step away from the doors"; "Please move to the rear
of the car"; "Please do not block the aisle"; etc. These superficial
requests are really, in substance, more in the nature of something
like imperatives or instructions. The "please" is intended to take
the edge off the tone that would otherwise be conveyed in a typi-
cally stressful social context.
Typically, in the context of an invocation before a more or less
diverse group, the word "please" might operate to take the peremp-
tory tone off the injunction "bow your heads." But the phrase as a
whole still, in the cultural context, normally conveys a sense of au-
thoritative social expectation. Formal punishment for non-
compliance is typically unnecessary. "Please bow your heads" oper-
ates, under established expectations, to coordinate the nature and
timing of group behavior. This function of the language in ques-
tion is certainly compatible with the possibility of coercion.
What is of specific interest here is that despite the emphasis on
coercion in both Lee and Santa Fe, no attention is paid to the possi-
ble difference between an invocation preceded by a request to bow
one's head, and an invocation not so preceded. A bowed head in
response to a summons to collective bowing can readily be visually
observed by many of those present, as can a head that remains un-
bowed despite an injunction to the contrary. An unbowed head,
under the circumstances, is readily interpreted as not just absent-
mindedness or inattention, but as an unequivocal signal of a delib-
erate refusal to bow one's head, indicating some sort of conscious
dissent or refusal.
In some such circumstances, an evident refusal to bow one's
head might well invite social sanctions far more clearly than merely
remaining motionless, along with everyone else, during an invoca-
tion. Refusing to bow one's head under such circumstances could
thus more plainly risk significant costs, with far less "plausible deni-
ability" than merely remaining motionless and silent along with
one's peers.
Bowing one's head in response to an explicit request to do so,
in contrast, may indicate entirely voluntary consent and affirma-
"9 For sophisticated discussion, see J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS
(J.o. Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds., 2d ed. 1975); PAUL GRIcE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS
OF WORDS (rev. ed. 1991); S. I. HAYAKAWA & ALAN HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN
THOUGHT & ACrION (5th ed. 1991); JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs: AN ESSAY IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).
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tion, but may well also indicate that one has been successfully sub-
jected to coercive influence to act as one would not otherwise act.
Adding further murkiness to the situation is that even in the ab-
sence of any explicit request for head-bowing, there may be a local
custom or expectation of head-bowing, known to dissenters, who
may realistically expect some degree of social disapproval for not
bowing their heads, even in the absence of any explicit request.
The bottom line here seems to be that a verbal request for a
bowing of heads may facilitate coercion by highlighting visible non-
compliance. But a court, as in Lee, can certainly still find the pres-
ence of a sufficient-or excessive-coercive influence even if it is
not possible to visually distinguish dissenters from non-dissenters.
All of this serves to add a further level of complexity to coercion
tests for Establishment Clause violations.
The Court in Santa Fe, in fact, then went on to note that some
students were effectively required to be physically present at the
football game."'o Of this number, we may assume some would not
be able to render themselves entirely inconspicuous at the time of
the invocation without a great deal of expense. A bit more contro-
versially, the Santa Fe majority then speaks precisely of all those stu-
dents with a "truly genuine desire"'5 ' to attend the game. It is un-
clear whether the Court means to suggest that a government's tak-
ing advantage of any "truly genuine desire" always, as a matter of a
proper choice of baseline, amounts to coercion. That one has a
truly genuine desire, of whatever intensity, to do something tells us
little about how one values or thinks about alternative activities.
Another possible reading would be that the government ought not,
as a moral or constitutional matter, take advantage of the presence
152of such students by authorizing a religious invocation. This ap
proach would be perfectly sensible, but it would also appear to de-
cide the Establishment Clause case in advance of working through
any serious coercion analysis.
It would also be easy to argue that any questions of student
motivation or coercion in appearing at the football game itself
need not be decisive on the overall Establishment Clause coercion
test. A student might appear at the football game, as a spectator,
on the merest personal whim, and be indifferent to remaining.
That student would hardly be coerced by anyone in attending the
'" See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311.
' Id. For an attempt to apply the free speech principle of a "captive audience" to
a case involving music at a graduation ceremony, see Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d
1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009).
' See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311-12.
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game. But if that student is also unaware of, or has forgotten
about, the practice of an invocation, such a student could still find
herself coerced to respond to a religious invocation in some argua-
bly positive fashion. A student need not have been coerced into
attending an event in order to amount, briefly, to a captive audi-
ence for unanticipated religious speech.
The school system's attempts in Santa Fe to insulate itself from
any religious character of the student's speech were deemed un-
availing. Certainly it is possible for a school to intentionally struc-
ture a superficially neutral selection process to systematically favor a
religious invocation, especially where a dominant majority faction
of students is so disposed.13 And the school system must ultimately
bear responsibility for any continuing or reasonably foreseeable
pattern among the student speeches at official commencement
ceremonies. 1 In Santa Fe, the school authorities themselves recog-
nized at least some degree of official responsibility through their
requirement that only "appropriate""'5 messages be delivered on
such occasions.
Ultimately, though, the degree of official responsibility for any
socially-based coercive effect of a student prayer may sometimes
depend, in some hopelessly vague and indeterminate way, on the
gradually accruing historical pattern of student speeches at com-
mencement. Would we be willing to find a public school responsi-
ble for any coercion if, on a single unprecedented occasion, and
contrary to school policy and a uniform history, a student-selected
commencement speaker departed from a prepared secular text to
deliver a brief prayer?56  Would we find, in contrast, sufficient
school "insulation" from any religious coercive effect if, on (only)
seven out of seventeen total occasions, the students had voted for
either no student speaker or for a secular theme? '5  Would we not
find the public school sufficiently implicated in or responsible for
"' See id. at 310-11.
1 For an unconvincing attempt by one school system to disclaim responsibility for
student speeches at official graduation ceremonies, see Adler v. Duval County School
Board, 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (seeking to distinguish Santa Fein
light of a different mix of speeches, legislative history, and disavowal by the school
of responsibility for the content of the speeches). For a critique of Adler, see Paul
Horowitz, Demographics and Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit on Graduation Prayer in
Adler v. Duval County, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 835 (2009).
"'Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304.
s' For loosely relevant free speech law, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
270 (1988).
. See Adler, 250 F.3d at 1339.
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any socially-based religious coercion if the student speeches were
consistently religious over time, to the point of predictability?'-"
The problem here, in particular, for any coercion test is that of
determining, in the rich, detailed historical context of any con-
tested case, whether to find a sufficient linkage between religious
coercion by private actors and the acts, omissions, intentions, and
states of awareness on the part of school authorities. In the ab-
sence of any determinate, widely accepted fleshing out of a theory
of coercion and responsibility, we may again anticipate that a coer-
cion test will in this regard merely reflect the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence of the courts developed on grounds apart from coer-
cion.
V. CONCLUSION
At this point, it should be clear that, in the contexts with which
we are concerned, the idea of coercion, in the hands of lay people,
technical philosophers, or judges, is itself hopelessly indeterminate.
The concept must be fleshed out, or somehow "moralized," in indi-
vidualized contexts' 59 in accordance with various particular choices
of "baseline" rights and other inescapably controversial normative
judgments. Even worse, though, is that in our contexts, judgments
as to what is coercive, "excessively" coercive on some sliding scale of
coerciveness,'" or unjustifiably coercive, must inevitably track many
of the same considerations that are already considered important
on any sensible alternative approach to the Establishment Clause.
A coercion test, even as a way of organizing one's thoughts, at best
contributes nothing of distinctive value to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
This is not to suggest, of course, that the idea of coercion is in
all possible contexts legally unimportant. We have, for example,
presumably come some distance from a now century-old judicial
reference to "the womanish plea of duress. But however more
enlightened we may be today in our richly varied, if murky, under-
" See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310.
"1 Consider, for example, the possibility that coercive force could depend on fac-
tors such as the size, insularity, or homogeneity of the school or local community.
See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm'rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1236 n.3 (10th Cir.
2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
'" Coerciveness is sometimes thought of as a matter of degree. See, e.g.,
WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 185; Held, supra note 78, at 59 ("Degree of coercion
seems to be a function of the undesirability of the outcome and the probability of
its occurring. . . .").
1' Wood v. Kan. City Home Tel. Co., 123 S.W. 6, 15 (Mo. 1909); see WERTHEIMER,
supra note 5, at 15.
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standing of coercion, the idea of coercion still contributes nothing
of value to our Establishment Clause case law, beyond other sensi-
ble approaches to that Clause.
Alternatives to a coercion theory may potentially offer certain
advantages, in that there is clearly a significant difference between
coercion on the one hand and the separate idea of discrimination
on the other.62 The important distinction between coercion and
discrimination also holds in Religion Clause contexts.'63 To the
extent that the idea of religious coercion does not capture all that
is considered by the idea of official religious discrimination, a focus
on religious coercion alone may well be deficient.
112 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 119
(2010) (implicitly distinguishing between coercion and discrimination in religious
contexts) (quoting Kent Greenawalt, History as Ideology: Phillip Hamburger's Separa-
tion of Church and State, 93 CAL. L. REV. 367, 390-91 (2005)); see also 2 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND TIIE CONSTITUTION: EsTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNEss 533
(2008).
. See supra note 162. We can, for example, imagine a public school that gives
modest official rewards, perhaps even only on a one-time, after-the-fact basis, for
approved religious behavior, and thus clearly discriminates among its students on
some favored religious basis, without coercing or seeking to coerce anyone's be-
havior or belief.
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